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Abstract. Many modern stream ciphers consist of a keystream gener-
ator and a key schedule algorithm. In fielded systems, security of the
keystream generator is often based on a large inner state rather than
an inherently secure design. Note, however, that little theory on the ini-
tialisation of large inner states exists, and many practical designs are
based on an ad-hoc approach. As a consequence, an increasing number
of attacks on stream ciphers exploit the (re-)initialisation of large inner
states by a weak key schedule algorithm.
In this paper, we propose a strict separation of keystream generator and
key schedule algorithm in stream cipher design. A formal definition of in-
ner state size is given, and lower bounds on the necessary inner state size
are proposed. After giving a construction for a secure stream cipher from
an insecure keystream generator, the limitations of such an approach are
discussed. We introduce the notion of inner state size efficiency and com-
pare it for a number of fielded stream ciphers, indicating that a secure
cipher can be based on reasonable inner state sizes. Concluding, we ask
a number of open questions that may give rise to a new field of research
that is concerned with the security of key schedule algorithms.
Keywords: Stream cipher, keystream generator, initialisation, inner state.
1 Introduction
Background: Let m = (m1, m2, . . .) be a message consisting of blocks mt ∈
{0, 1}w. A stream cipher is a pair of efficient algorithms, where encryption trans-
forms a message block mt into a ciphertext block ct ∈ {0, 1}
w and decryption
implements the inverse transformation. Both encryption and decryption run un-
der the control of a key K and a counter t. Note that the use of a counter is the
critical difference between a stream cipher and a block cipher.
A frequent building block for stream ciphers is a keystream generator, i.e.
a finite state machine that transforms K into a pseudorandom bitstream z =
(z1, z2, . . .) with zt ∈ {0, 1}
w. In most cases, zt is added bitwise to mt for en-
cryption and to ct for decryption.
While a large body of literature exists on the design of keystream genera-
tors (cf. [33, 27]), the remaining aspects of stream cipher design are less well
researched. Only few guidelines exist for the choice of important parameters like
key length, inner state size, or the number of bits produced before re-keying. The
same uncertainty exists with respect to the key setup algorithm that transforms
the key into a starting state for the generator.
The consequences in practical stream cipher design are twofold. On one hand,
an increasing number of stream ciphers is broken not by attacking the keystream
generator, but by attacking the key setup algorithm (e.g. RC/4 as used in the
WEP protocol [35], or A5/1 from the GSM standard [17]). There exist a few
general attack techniques against weak setup functions for stream ciphers exist
(e.g. resynchronisation attacks [13, 23]), but no design criteria for good initial-
isation functions. Considering recent research progress on related key attacks
for pseudorandom functions (see [6] and subsequent work), more problems for
stream ciphers designed in an ad-hoc manner are to be expected in the future.
On the other hand, when a cipher is successfully attacked, a common solution
is to change the parameters while keeping the general design intact. Examples
include increasing the inner state size (e.g. for LILI-128 [9]) or decreasing the
security level (e.g. for Sober-128 [25]). For some ciphers, huge security margins
for the parameters are used in the first place (e.g. more than 33,000 bit of inner
state for SEAL [32]).
Paper outline: This paper is intended as a starting point for future research on
the design of stream ciphers. We consider the construction of such ciphers from
two primitives: a keystream generator and a matching initialisation function.
Observe that the inner state of the cipher forms the interface between those
two primitives. While a large inner state is advantageous for the security of
the keystream generator, it makes the task of the initialisation algorithm more
difficult. Thus, the inner state should be chosen as large as necessary, but as
small as possible.
Our goal is to improve the understanding of the necessity and the limitations
of the inner state. To this purpose, in section 2, we introduce a formal model of
the stream ciphers considered. In section 3, we derive a formal definition of the
inner state size, along with an illustration why such a definition is not as trivial
as it may seem. Section 4 discusses the cryptographic relevance of inner states,
giving lower bounds on the minimum size as well as a construction for a secure
stream cipher when inner state size and initialisation time are not critical. In
section 5, we observe that the inner state size has to be limited in most practical
stream ciphers. This leads us to the definition of inner state efficiency, yielding
a measure of how much the inner state size actually contributes to the security
of the keystream generator. We also give concrete values of inner state efficiency
for a number of practical stream ciphers. Concluding, in section 6, our results
are summarised, and a list of open questions for future research on stream cipher
design is presented.
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Fig. 1. General model of a keystream generator
2 Terminology
2.1 Keystream generators
Basic model: In [33], Rueppel defined a keystream generator as consisting of the
following components (see the box in figure 1):
(a) An inner state St ∈ S with S ⊆ {0, 1}
n,
(b) an update function f : S → S that modifies the inner state with each clock,
and
(c) an output function g : {0, 1}v → {0, 1}w, w ≤ v ≤ n, that uses the inner
state to compute w keystream bits with each clock.
Deployment in stream ciphers: Keystream generators are often used in cryptog-
raphy to implement efficient stream ciphers. A wide-spread design requires the
following additional components:
(A) A secret key K ∈ {0, 1}l that is not necessarily identical to the inner state,
(B) an initialisation function h : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}m → S that derives the initial
inner state S0 from the key K and m bit of additional information (like an
initial value or a nonce), and
(C) the xor-function ⊕ : {0, 1}w×{0, 1}w → {0, 1}w which adds the keystream
bitwise modulo 2 to the plaintext, generating the ciphertext1.
2.2 Attacker model
Prior knowledge: The attacker is assumed to know everything about the stream
cipher with the exception of the key K and the current inner state St. In par-
ticular, he is aware of the set S of possible inner states and of the functions f, g
and h. He also knows (or even controls) the m bit of public information that are
used, along with the key, to set up the inner state S0.
1 In fact, other functions like addition modulo 2w are also possible, but rarely used.
3
Class of attack: We consider a known-plaintext attack. Since knowledge of plain-
text and ciphertext implies knowledge of the keystream, it can be assumed that
the attacker has L  2l known keystream bits at his disposal.
Computational resources: The attacker can do any computation that requires
less steps than a complete search over the key space. This bound holds both for
the precomputation and the actual attack phase, implying a bound of strictly
less than 2l bits of memory that can be used.
Notion of success: An attacker is considered successful if he can correctly pre-
dict previously unknown keystream bits, or if he can distinguish the output of
the keystream generator from truly random bits. We say that the keystream
generator is broken if there exists an attacker whose success probability differs
significantly from pure guessing. Note that in particular, reconstruction of a
correct tupel (t, St) or of the key K implies a successful attack in the above
sense.
3 Defining the size of inner states
3.1 Problem illustration
Surprisingly, defining the size of the inner state is not as trivial as it may seem.
Consider the following examples as an illustration.
SOBER-128: This nonlinear filter generator proposed by Hawkes and Rose [25]
is the ideal case; the inner state consists of a 17 stage LFSR over GF(232) with
primitive feedback polynomial. Thus, all (232)17 = 2544 inner states with the
exception of the all zero state can be attained over time if the generator is run
long enough without re-keying. Thus, there is little doubt that the inner state
has size 544 bit.
RC4: The algorithm that is generally assumed to be Rivest’s RC4 generator [29]
takes some more thought. At first glance, the 8-bit version uses an inner state
table that consists of 256 bytes, along with two 8-bit variables, yielding an inner
state of 2048 + 16 = 2064 bit.
However, this table is used to store permutations over
 
256, which reduces
the number of possible table states to 256! ≈ 21684. Thus, it could be argued
that the inner state is about 1684 + 16 = 1700 bit long.
If, however, the size is defined by the number of states that can actually
be attained, things get even more complicated. The initial values of the 8-bit
variables are key-independent, and it was demonstrated by Finney [18] that an
easily characterised class of inner states can never occur. Thus, the inner state
size lies somewhere between 1684 (derived from the number of valid starting
states) and 1700 (derived from the number of representable states), where none
of the bounds is tight.
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SEAL 3.0: The generator proposed by Coppersmith and Rogaway [32] uses two
different kinds of inner states. On one hand, there are 8 32-bit variables and 12
counter bits that change constantly over time. Since they can in principle attain
all possible values, they contribute 268 bit to the inner state size.
On the other hand, however, the algorithm uses huge lookup tables R, S and
T with a total size of 32,768 bits. These tables are generated from the 160-bit
key and a 32-bit nonce using a hash function in counter mode. Since they are
never modified during keystream generation, only 2192 different assignments to
the tables are possible. One might be tempted to state that the tables contribute
only 192 bit to the size of the inner state, but then again, no efficient algorithm
is known that distinguishes a valid table setting from an invalid one. This means
that in practice, a possible attacker faces the full state space of 33,036 bits.
Adding to the conceptional confusion, one table contains values that are
used only once during the encryption process. Thus, given enough processing
time, the corresponding entries could be calculated as need arises, making it
possible to replace a 8, 192 bit table by a simple 6-bit counter in an algorithmic
implementation. This raises the question of whether or not the inner state size
is reduced, too.
3.2 Autonomous finite state machines
A na¨ıve candidate for the inner state size is the parameter n, as described in
section 2.1. This parameter denotes the length of the inner state representation.
There is, however, the obvious problem that the same generator may be repre-
sented in different ways, yielding different values of n depending on the concrete
implementation.
Instead, in order to derive a unique definition of the inner state size, we con-
sider an autonomous finite state machine (AFSM) implementing the generator.
Such an AFSM consists of a set S of inner states, and for each inner state S ∈ S,
there exists
– a transition rule that defines the next state f(S) for S, and
– a label defining the output g(S) generated from S.
In addition, each finite state machine needs a set S0 of valid starting states.
Note that there exists an infinite number of AFSM describing the generator.
In particular, the size of the AFSM (i.e. the number of inner states) can vary
arbitrarily. Thus, in order to find a unique value for the number of inner states,
we need to revert to the notion of the minimal AFSM describing the generator.
An AFSM is said to generate an (infinite) output sequence z = (z0, z1, . . .)
if there exists a starting state S0 ∈ S0 such that zi = g(f
i(S0)). Two AFSM A
and B are said to be equivalent if all (infinite) output sequences produced by
A are also produced by B, and vice versa. As a consequence, all AFSM that
describe a given keystream generator are equivalent. An AFSM is said to be
minimal if no equivalent AFSM of smaller size exists. Thus, if a minimal AFSM
for a given generator can be found, its size yields the minimal number of inner
states required to implement the generator.
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3.3 Valid starting states
The size of a minimal AFSM for a given generator depends on the set S0 of valid
starting states. Consider, as a toy example, a 2-bit version of the RC4 generator,
where the inner state consists of two 2-bit variables and a table representing a
permutation over {0, 1, 2, 3}.
1. If we allow all assignments to the two 2-bit variables and all assignments
to a 4× 2-bit table as initial states, we end up with a minimal AFSM with
24+8 = 4096 inner states, all of which are starting states.
2. If we allow all assignments to the variables, but restrict the table entries to
correct permutations, the minimal AFSM will have 24 ·4! = 384 inner states,
all of which are starting states.
3. If we initialise the variables to zero (as we should for a correct RC4 imple-
mentation), we have only 4! = 24 starting states left, and exactly 24 states
are no longer reachable. Thus, the size of the minimal AFSM drops to 360.
4. If we take the initialisation function h and the key length l into account, the
number of starting states may even be smaller, which in turn may or may
not affect the size of the minimal AFSM.
Note that the inner state size should depend only on the keystream generator.
Thus, the initialisation function must not be considered when defining S0, dis-
carding case 4. However, what should be known is the interface between the
keystream generator and the initialisation function: A set of conditions that the
output of any initialisation function must meet in order to guarantee the correct
working of the generator. In the case of 2-bit RC4, those conditions would be
the ones described in case 3: Both variables must be set to zero, and the table
must contain an arbitary permutation over {0, 1, 2, 3}.
3.4 Final definition
Basic model, extended: A keystream generator consists of an inner state space
S, an update function, and an output function, as described in conditions (a)
to (c) in subsection 2.1. However, it must also have an additional component,
namely
(d) a Boolean predicates C : S → {0, 1}, such that an inner state S is a valid
starting state iff C(S) = 1.
Analogously, condition (B) in subsection 2.1 must be corrected such that a
stream cipher contains
(B) an initialisation function h : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}m → S that derives a starting
state S0 from the key K and m bit of additional information (like an initial
value or a nonce), such that C(S0) = 1.
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Inner state size: Given the above definitions of a keystream generator, a (min-
imal) autonomous finite state machine and its size, we can define the unique
inner state size of the generator as follows:
Definition 1. Let G be a keystream generator as defined above, and let A be a
minimal AFSM implementing G. Then the inner state size of the generator G
is defined as nˆ := dlog2(|A|)e, where |A| is the number of inner states of A.
4 Cryptographic strength from large inner states
4.1 The necessity of large inner states
In the following, let l denote the key length, nˆ the inner state size and n the
length of the inner state representation (n ≥ nˆ). For most practical stream
ciphers, it can be observed that n > l holds. We will briefly discuss that this is
in fact a necessary condition for secure stream ciphers.
First lower bound: The main design goals of practical stream ciphers are security
and efficiency. In order to achieve the efficiency goal, the functions f , g and h
are chosen to be as simple as possible. In particular, g : {0, 1}v → {0, 1}w is
constructed such that w ≤ v < min{l, n}.
Lemma 1. Let the output function g depend on v < l inner state bits and let the
output be balanced. Then the keystream generator can not be secure if n < l +w.
Proof. For such a generator, a divide-and-conquer attack can be mounted: The
attacker guesses all v bits of the inner state representation that are input to g
(since v < l, this is feasible in our attack model). He then verifies whether the
output of g matches the observed value z0. Since g is balanced, only 2
−w of all
assignments meet this criterion, strongly reducing the search space. The attacker
can now mount a complete search over the remaining assignments, yielding an
attack in 2n−w steps. If n < l+w, this attack would be more efficient than brute
force search over the key space of the stream cipher. 2
Since the value n depends on the implementation and is thus not under the
control of the cipher designer, the inner state size must be chosen such that the
above attack becomes infeasible for all implementations.
Corollary 1. If v < l, a necessary condition for a secure keystream generator
is nˆ ≥ l + w.
Note that for many ciphers, this attack can be extended using a backtracking
approach [21, 37, 36], yielding an even greater lower bound on the minimum size
of the inner state.
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Second lower bound: The requirement for a large inner state gets even stronger
if the attacker has a large amount of keystream bits at his disposal. In this case,
time-memory-data tradeoff attacks have to be taken into account, as follows.
Lemma 2. Let L be the number of keystream bits available to the attacker. Then
the keystream generator can not be secure if n < l + log(L).
Proof. A general time-memory-data tradeoff [3, 21, 7] for w = 1 can be conducted
as follows:
– Precomputation phase: The attacker draws a large sample (say, 2l−) of inner
states at random from S. For each sample state Si, the generator is run to
produce an l-bit output zi. The tuple (zi, Si) is stored in a table, indexed by
zi.
– Attack phase: The attacker segments the known output stream into roughly
L overlapping frames z˜j of l bits
2. For each frame, he checks whether z˜j is
contained in the table, and if yes, he extracts the inner state S.
By the birthday paradoxon, there is high probability for a collision between the
set of samples zi in the table and the set of observations z˜j in the keystream
if 2l− · L ≈ 2n. Since this attack requires 2l− precomputations and L table-
lookups, it is feasible for the attacker if n ≈ l + log(L)− , where  is small.
Note that this proof can be generalised for arbitrary values of w by using frame
lengths that are multiples of w, yielding the same result. 2
Again, the cipher designer can not control n, but only the inner state size nˆ.
Remembering that an attacker who is restricted to 2l operations can read at
most L = 2l output bits, we obtain the following lower bound:
Corollary 2. If the generator produces arbitrarily large output streams, a nec-
essary condition for a secure keystream generator is nˆ ≥ 2l.
4.2 A generic construction
We have seen that for efficient and secure stream ciphers, the inner state size nˆ
must be strictly larger than the key size l. An obvious question is: What happens
if we increase nˆ further? An interesting observation is that a large inner state can
be used to make up for the deficiencies of a relatively weak keystream generator.
Constructing the stream cipher: Let H = {Hn | n ∈   } be a family of crypto-
graphically secure hash functions Hn : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n. Let G = {Gn | n ∈   }
be a family of keystream generators with n = nˆ.3 Furthermore, let the generator
be such that the mapping from state space to the first n keystream bits is bijec-
tive. Finally, we assume that there exists a known parameter c, 0 < c < 1, such
2 To be exact, there are L − l + 1 such frames.
3 Many keystream generators are of that kind, e.g. many LFSR-based combination
and filter generators or clock-controlled generators.
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that for any generator Gn ∈ G and given n bits of output stream, predicting
additional output bits will require at least 2cn computational steps for all but
O(1) cases.
Given these building blocks, we can construct a stream cipher with security
level l as follows. First, choose n such that c · n > l, and use Gn as keystream
generator. The n bits of inner state for generator Gn are initialised using the
matching hash function Hn : {0, 1}
l × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n.
Security against inversion: It can be shown that such a stream cipher is secure
against inversion attacks, as long as no assumption about Gn and Hn is violated.
Lemma 3. If the stream cipher (Gn, Hn) can be inverted in less than 2
l steps,
then the hash function Hn can be inverted in less than 2
l + n steps.
Proof. Assume that there exists an attacker A who, given the description of
(Gn, Hn) and at least n bit of cipher output z, can invert the stream cipher in
less than 2l steps. Then we can construct an inverter A′ who, given a valid output
y of the hash function Hn, finds a corresponding input x such that Hn(x) = y.
– A′ runs the keystream generator on inner state representation y, producing
n bit of cipher output z = Gn(y).
– A′ invokes attacker A with input z and obtains a key k with Gn(Hn(k)) = z.
– A′ outputs k.
Note that k meets the condition Gn(Hn(k)) = z. Since Gn is injective, there
exists only one intermediate value y with Gn(y) = z, implying that Hn(k) = y.
Thus, A′ has inverted the hash function, using 2l + n computational steps. 2
Security against prediction: Analogously, it can be shown that the stream cipher
is secure against prediction attacks, as long as the output of keystream generator
Gn can not be predicted in less than 2
cn computational steps in all but a small
number of cases.
Lemma 4. If the stream cipher (Gn, Hn) can be predicted in less than 2
l steps,
then the keystream generator Gn can be predicted in less than 2
l steps on a
significant subset of its inputs.
Proof. Assume that there exists an attacker A who, given the description of
(Gn, Hn) and output bits (z0, . . . , zn−1), can predict output bits (zn, . . . , zn+d−1)
correctly in less than 2l steps. Then we can construct a trivial predictor A′ who,
given a valid output (z0, . . . , zn−1) of Gn, can predict the subsequent output bits
(zn, . . . , zn+d−1) in at least 2
l different cases.
– A′ runs A on input (z0, . . . , zn−1) and obtains bits (zn, . . . , zn+d−1).
– A′ outputs (zn, . . . , zn+d−1).
Note that due to the injectivity of Gn, (z0, . . . , zn−1) was generated from a
unique starting state S0. For the analysis, we have to distinguish two cases:
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(a) If S0 is a possible output of Hn, the sequence (z0, . . . , zn−1) is a correct
output of the stream cipher (Gn, Hn). Thus, if A predicts correctly for the
stream cipher, A′ predicts correctly for the generator.
(b) If, however, no key k exists such that Hn(k) = S0, the behaviour of A (and
thus of A′) is undefined - the prediction may or may not be correct.
In any case, the running time of A′ is identical to the running time of A, yielding
an effort of less than 2l steps. Note that the algorithm is always right if case (a)
occurs, yielding a correct prediction in at least 2l (out of 2n) cases. 2
5 Inner state efficiency
5.1 Disadvantages of large inner states
In fact, practical stream ciphers often use a relatively weak keystream generator
and rely on the inner state size and the key schedule algorithm for security. Since
constructing a cipher in the above way is tempting, why not use it as a general
design rule?
With all their advantages as demonstrated in sections 4.1 and 4.2, there are
also three arguments against large inner states. The first (and most obvious)
one is that memory is not for free. While on a modern PC, sufficient memory
should be available, other platforms like encryption hardware or smartcards may
require a more economical use of resources. A second problem is that crypto-
graphic memory must be protected from observation (both on general purpose
and specialised hardware), and that an increase in memory size increases the
options of an attacker, e.g. for side-channel attacks.
But there is third, more subtle reason why large inner states do not only
provide advantages: most practical stream ciphers have to be re-initialised on a
regular basis; i.e. after producing a fixed number of output bits, a new inner state
is computed from the same key K, but with different additional information. This
can be for synchronisation purposes, but also due to cryptographical reasons.4
However, for a stream cipher with a large inner state, either performance or
security of the initialisation procedure is impaired.5 If the cipher re-initialises
rather often, the function h must be computable in as few computational steps
as possible. On the other hand, a good mixing of key and nonce into the start-
ing state can not be obtained in a small number of computational steps. The
lack of widely accepted design criteria for such initialisation functions further
complicates the problem.
4 Note that once the number of keystream bits available to the attacker gets large, most
keystream generators become vulnerable to a wide range of cryptanalytic techniques,
like time-memory-data tradeoffs, correlation attacks, differential attacks, or algebraic
attacks.
5 This line of research was first proposed to us by W. Meier [31].
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Cipher lmax nˆ σ γ
A5/1 [8] 64 64 32.0 0.5000
Lili-128 [14] 128 128 48.0 0.3750
E0 [1] 128 132 49.0 0.3712
Sober-t32 [26] 256 544 158.0 0.2904
SNOW 1.0 [15] 256 576 100.0 0.1736
Scream [24] 128 4,116 100.0 0.0243
RC4 (8bit) [29] 256 1,700 30.6 0.0180
Leviathan [30] 256 6,784 39.0 0.0057
Seal 3.0 [32] 160 33,036 43.0 0.0013
Table 1. Keystream generators of fielded stream ciphers (details: appendix A)
5.2 Efficient inner state size
For all of the above reasons, the inner state size must not be too large, even
though a certain minimum size for the inner state is necessary, as shown in sub-
section 4.1. Note that the lower bound on the required inner state size depends on
the quality of the keystream generator. In order to make comparisons between
different generators possible, we introduce a measure of inner state efficiency,
much in analogy to the well-known efficient key size.
Definition 2. Let G be a keystream generator, and let A be the best known
attack against G. The efficient inner state size of G is a number σ ∈   such that
executing A takes as many computational steps as a brute force search over 2σ
starting states of G. The quotient γ = σ/nˆ is denoted as the inner state efficiency
and is a measure for the quality of the keystream generator G.
5.3 Comparison of fielded stream ciphers
For an arbitrary generator, the inner state efficiency lies in the range of 0 ≤
γ ≤ 1. However, using the time-memory-data tradeoff technique presented in
subsection 4.1, it can be shown that for a generator that produces at least 2nˆ/2
output bits, the inner state efficiency is restricted to 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.5. But what
values of γ are encountered in practice?
In table 1, the efficiency δ of inner states is compared for a number of con-
temporary stream ciphers. We denote by lmax the maximum key length of the
overall stream cipher. Note that σ represents the most efficient attack that (a)
has been published at the moment and that (b) targets the keystream genera-
tor only. Also note that runtime estimates for cryptographic attacks are always
somewhat tricky, but the order of magnitude should be correct. In appendix A,
a short description is given on how values nˆ and σ have been derived.
It can be observed that the stream ciphers with particularly large internal
states have very low inner state efficiencies. It could be argued that the at-
tacks that determined σ for these ciphers are distinguishing attacks, and that in
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all cases, it is not known how to transform them into prediction or key recon-
struction algorithms.6 But then again, distinguishing attacks could be mounted
against the ciphers with smaller inner states, too, with less drastic results. As
a consequence, the ciphers with large inner states do not seem to enjoy a real
advantage over ciphers with small values for nˆ. In other words: It should be
possible to construct a secure stream cipher from a generator with a reasonable
inner state size.
6 Conclusions and research directions
Directions for future research: The following is an incomplete list of open ques-
tions that might be of interest for a more thorough understanding of stream
cipher design.
– How much inner state is required to make a stream cipher secure?
– What is the right cryptographic primitive for a key schedule algorithm? Is
a full-scale pseudorandom function generator required, or can we get away
with a less strict security requirement?
– What constructions for provably secure stream ciphers can be given, in par-
ticular in the concrete security setting [5]?
– Can a set of practical design guidelines for key schedule algorithms be de-
veloped, in analogy to the design guidelines for block ciphers or keystream
generators?
– What are the conditions for a direct attack on the key? Or, put another way:
What can be said about the relationship between the keystream generator
and the key schedule? Is it possible to develop a good stream cipher by using
generic keystream generators and key setup algorithms independently? Or
should both algorithms be chosen in an orthogonal way, being dependent on
one another?
– What knowledge about key schedule algorithms from block ciphers can be
re-used for stream cipher initialisation?
Summary: We have considered a wide-spread type of stream cipher and have
given a definition for the inner state size of such ciphers. It was shown that an
increase in inner state size can increase the security of the keystream generator
used, but at the same time can slow down or even weaken the initialisation
function. As a consequence, we propose to evaluate the strength of the keystream
generator used relative to its inner state size. To this end, the notion of inner
state efficiency was introduced. In an ad-hoc survey of practical stream ciphers,
ciphers with large inner states displayed no cryptographical advantage over those
with small inner states. This is an indication that efficient use of inner states is
not just a theoretical claim, but is feasible in practice. To this end, we gave a
number of questions that may be addressed by future research.
6 In addition, these ciphers are not meant to be re-synchronised frequently. Thus, they
can indeed afford larger internal states under running time considerations, since re-
initialisation is required only rarely.
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A Deriving nˆ and σ
In the following, the inner states and best known attacks for the keystream gen-
erators in section 5.3 are discussed. In most cases, inner states can be subdivided
into a linear part (i.e. inner states whose update function is linear), a nonlinear
part, and key-dependent S-boxes which may or may not be bijective.
Note that for each stream cipher, only those attacks that target the keystream
generator directly are considered.
– A5/1: The inner state is purely linear, consisting of 64 bit.
Numerous attacks have been proposed against the full A5/1 stream cipher,
all taking into account that in practice, only a small number of output bits
is available to the attacker. If, however, we assume an arbitrary amount
of output bits, the generic time-memory-tradeoff attack is most efficient,
yielding σ = 32.
– E0: The inner state consists of a 128-bit linear part and a 4-bit nonlinear
part.
A number of attacks against the E0 generator have been proposed in litera-
ture. For the time being, the algebraic attack technique proposed by Courtois
[11] using equations developed by Armknecht and Krause [2] seems to be the
most efficient, requiring roughly 249 computational steps. The attack does,
however, require more consecutive output bits than the cipher produces be-
tween two re-initialisations.
– Leviathan: The inner state consists of a 48-bit counter and 4 permutation
tables over {0, 1}8. Thus, the overall inner state size is 16+4 ·1, 684 = 6, 784
bit.
The best known attack against Leviathan is a distinguisher by Crowley and
Lucks [12], requiring 239 bits of output and a similar work effort.
– LILI-128: The inner state consists of two independent linear states of sizes
39 and 89 bit, respectively, yielding a total inner state size of 128 bit.
Given the construction of the cipher, a security level of 128 bit was not
achievable in the first place due to lemma 1. As a consequence, a number
of attacks on LILI-128 have been published, the most efficient one being
a specialised time-memory attack by Saarinen [34] that requires roughly
248 computational steps. Note that the attack proposed by Courtois in [11]
formally requires less computational steps, but needs 260 output bits.
In the meantime, a successor LILI-II has been published [9]. The inner state
size has been almost doubled to 255 bits, with the allowed key size still at
128 bit. No cryptanalysis of LILI-II has been published so far.
– RC4 (8-bit version): As already mentioned in section 3.1, the inner state size
of RC4 is difficult to analyse. It consists of two 8-bit state variables and a
table that implements a permutation {0, 1}8 that changes over time. Nor-
mally, this would yield an inner state size of 16+1, 684 = 1, 700 bit. However,
the starting values for the state variables are key-independent, and it was
shown by Finney [18] that a fraction of 1/256 states can never be reached.
Experiments on smaller versions of RC4 seem to indicate that the fraction
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of non-reachable states is even larger but still small enough that 1, 700 is a
good approximation of the inner state size.
Numerous attacks against RC4 have been described. A particularly strong
attack against its keystream generator was proposed by Golic´ [22] and im-
proved by Fluhrer and McGrew [20]. The attack is a distinguisher that re-
quires 230.6 output bits and a similar amount of work.
– Scream: The generator uses an evolving state of 128 bit, a round key of
256 bit, a mask table (16 times 16 bytes) of 2,048 bit, and an S-Box that
implements a permutation over {0, 1}8 (1,684 bit). Thus, the inner state size
is 4,116 bit.
The best attack against Scream that we are aware of is a linear distinguisher
by Johansson and Maximov [28]. It requires about 2100 output bits and a
similar work effort. Note, however, that Scream has been published only quite
recently, i.e. it has not yet received the full cryptanalytic consideration.
– Seal 3.0: The generator uses a 12 bit counter, 8 32-bit state words, and a set
of lookup tables consisting of 1024 32-bit words, contributing up to 32, 768
bit to the inner state. Thus, the inner state size of the generator is 33, 036
bit.
While the state words are re-initialised every 26 · 27 = 213 output bits, the
tables are re-initialised once every 219 output bits. Thus, SEAL has two ini-
tialisation functions h1 and h2, and can be seen considered as a stream cipher
(H, G) = ((h1, h2), g). Note that the best known attack - a distinguishing
attack by Fluhrer [19] that requires rougly 243 computational steps - is only
applicable if (h2, g) is considered as the keystream generator.
7
– Snow 1.0: The linear part contributes 16 32-bit words to the inner state,
while the nonlinear part adds another 2 32-bit words, yielding a total inner
state size of 576 bit.
Amongst the attacks proposed against Snow 1.0, the most efficient is a dis-
tinguisher by Coppersmith et al. [10], requiring about 2100 computational
steps.
An updated version Snow 2.0 with equal inner state size has been proposed
[16], but no cryptanalytic results are available yet.
– Sober-t32: Here, the inner state is purely linear, consisting of 17 32-bit words.
Thus, the inner state size is 544 bit.
The most efficient attack against full Sober-t32 is a distinguisher presented
by Babbage et al. [4], requiring 2153+5 = 2158 output bits and a similar work
effort.
Recently, a new version Sober-128 with equal inner state size but reduced
key length was published [25]. However, no cryptanalytic results are available
for the time being.
7 The inner generator g is in fact a one-time pad: Without additional knowledge about
the initialisation function, it is secure in an information-theoretical sense.
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